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DOES THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999 REQUIRE
THAT A NOTICE BE GIVEN TO PASSENGERS?
WHAT IS THE VALIDITY OF NOTICE OF A CHOICE
OF FORUM CLAUSE UNDER MONTREAL 1999?
SENAI W. ANDEMARIAM*
I. INTRODUCTIONO NE OF THE MOST important areas of concern in trans-
port by air or sea is the choice of law and forum applicable
to the transport when a dispute arises. The fact that:
" passengers' and carriers are often nationals or domiciliaries
of different countries or regions of a country;
• the economic strength of the carriers and the passengers
are almost always of a stark difference;
" different courts use different procedures of litigation;
* the public policy preferences adhered to by different courts
- whether protecting the carriers or the passengers - are
oftentimes different,
makes choice of law and forum one of, if not, the most impor-
tant areas of concern in international transportation law.
Before proceeding to the subject matter of the discussion,
there are some basic points that must be noted.
First, there is a difference in the party autonomy that the par-
ties have in choosing the law and forum applicable to the type of
transport before a dispute arises. The parties have a greater au-
tonomy in domestic transportation than they have in interna-
tional transport. In international transportation, the relevant
* Professor of Aviation Law, University of Asmara, Eritrea. Special thanks to
professors Allan Mendelsohn and Warren Dean of Georgetown University Law
Center ("GULC") for their advice and comments on the progress of an aviation
law seminar paper from which this article was developed. The author owes
gratitude to his GULC classmate and friend Anthony Davidowitz for carefully
going through the paper and correcting grammatical and related mistakes.
I This article is limited to the transport of passengers by air or sea. It does not
address the transport of cargo or luggage.
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conventions list the different countries where the suit can be
filed.2 Thus, the parties do not have wide discretion to select
the applicable law and forum by a pre-dispute agreement.
Second, the conventions on international transportation by air
and sea also differ from each other on the choice of forum provi-
sions. It has been indicated that the Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air of 1929 ("Warsaw Convention" or "Warsaw") has strict
provisions on the applicability of the Warsaw Convention for in-
ternational transportation by air and the availability of a choice
of forum.4 On the contrary, the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Carriage of Pas-
sengers by Sea of 1961 ("Brussels 1961," also known as "Little
Warsaw" for being modeled mainly after the Warsaw Conven-
tion), while stating when Little Warsaw applies as a governing
law,5 does not have any list of forums where suit can be brought.
The only provision related to the choice of forum is Article 9,
2 See, e.g., Warsaw Convention, infra note 3.
3 On the Applicable Law. Article 1 of the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air of 1929 states that the
convention is the applicable law in an international transportation whose places
of departure and destination are in the High Contracting Parties. Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, art. 1 [hereinafter Warsaw Con-
vention]. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to see how the carrier and the
passenger can agree that the Warsaw Convention does not apply in such interna-
tional transportation. On Selection of Forum. Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
reads: "An Action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff .... "
Id. at art. 28 (emphasis added). Four forums were selected in the Warsaw Con-
vention, and a fifth forum was added in the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971
(Article XII), Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 October
1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955,
Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613, ICOA Doc. 8932, art. 12, and the Montreal Conven-
tion of 1999 (Article 33 (2)). Convention for International Carriage by Air Done
at Montreal, May 28, 1999, 1999 WL 33292734, art. 33(2) [hereinafter Montreal
1999]. The Convention provides no discretion for the parties to select a forum
(whether one of the five contained in the Convention or a different one) by a
pre-dispute agreement.
4 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
5 Article 2 of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to the Carriage of Passengers by Sea of 1961 reads: "The Conven-
tion shall apply to any international carriage if either the ship flies the flag of a
Contacting State or if, according to the contract of carriage, either the place of
departure or the place of destination is in a Contracting State (emphasis ad-
ded)." International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the Carriage of Passengers of Sea of 1961 art.2, Apr. 29, 1961 [hereinafter Little
Warsaw].
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which nullifies, among other things, a pre-dispute choice of ju-
risdiction or arbitration.6
Both in domestic and international transport, the carriers
usually have a contract of carriage that is prepared for the pas-
sengers. The passengers are given the contract that contains all
the basic provisions for the contract of carriage ("Contracts of
Adhesion"). Usually, such contracts contain provisions on the
applicable law and forum for any disputes that may arise out of
the transportation, defining the limitation of carrier liability and
other issues. Different courts have tended to accept Contracts
of Adhesion as a reasonable solution to the application
problems of different laws and forums for all the passengers that
might ensue in the absence of such a previously identified law
and forum.7 Others, however, tended to refuse enforcing such
clauses, considering them to supercede the power of the courts
to handle cases.'
An important concept in international transportation law re-
lated to the choice of law and forum is the proper communica-
tion (also called "reasonable communicativeness") given by the
carrier to the passenger. This communication is to inform the
passenger which relevant convention applies to solve the dis-
putes that arise out of the carriage. A number of conventions
provide that the carrier has a duty to inform the passenger in a
reasonable manner lest the carrier lose some of the benefits that
the conventions give to the carrier. The courts reasoned that
the passengers, being so notified of the applicability of the con-
ventions, would be able to take other precautionary measures
(for example, insurance) to cover the losses that the conven-
tions cannot remedy.' Different courts have maintained differ-
ent standards of what could be called an "adequate
communication" of such a "notice" to the passenger."°
A. SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
The scope of this article is limited to:
6 For a detailed discussion of the 1961 Brussels Convention, see Axel Gehrin-
ger, After Carnival Cruise and Sky Reefer: An Analysis of Forum Selection Clauses in
Maritime and Aviation Transactions, 66J. AIR L. & CoM. 633, 671-73 (2001).
7 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991).
8 Gehringer, supra note 6, at 651.
9. See, e.g., Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1965).
10 See, e.g., Warren, 352 F.2d at 495-98.
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" Addressing the issue of adequate communication (notice)
of the applicability of the international convention on the
transportation of passengers by air (Warsaw et. al). Issues
related to international transportation of cargo or luggage
by air and issues related to national or international trans-
portation of passengers, cargo or luggage are not discussed.
" Addressing the choice of forum issue in international trans-
portation of passengers.
Issues related to choice of law or to the concept of forum non
conveniens are not the subjects of this article.
II. THE CONCEPT OF ADEQUATE COMMUNICATION
(NOTICE) OF THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
OF PASSENGERS BY AIR
A. INTRODUCTION
In the jurisprudence of international transportation by air,
one of the most important principles is the limitation of the car-
rier's liability in the event of death or personal (bodily) injury
suffered by the passengers."' To be precise, scholars identified
11 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 7/98-144 (2d
ed. 1981). The History of International Aviation Law indicates that the limitation
on a carrier's liability has been the nuclear principle upon which Warsaw and the
amendments to Warsaw were established. Id. at 7-27. Limitation of liability has
also been the main reason why the United States moved the Warsaw members to
amend Warsaw. In fact, this is the main reason why the United States decided to
withdraw from Warsaw, had it not been for the signing of the 1966 IATA Inter-
Carrier Agreement, which raised the limit to $75,000, with absolute liability for
international air transport originating from, destined to, or having an agreed
stop in the United States. When a higher limit was made part of the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air of 1999
signed at Montreal ("Montreal 1999"), President William J. Clinton, in his letter
to the U.S. Senate for Advice and Consent sent on September 6, 2000, stated:
Upon entry into force for the United States, the Convention, where
applicable, would supersede the Warsaw Convention, as amended
by the Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, done at Mon-
treal September 25, 1975 ("Montreal Protocol No. 4"), which en-
tered into force for the United States on March 4, 1999. The
Convention represents a vast improvement over the liability regime estab-
lished under the Warsaw Convention and its related instruments, rela-
tive to passenger rights in the event of an accident. Among other
benefits, the Convention eliminates the cap on carrier liability to accident
victims; holds carriers strictly liable for proven damages up to 100, 000 Spe-
cial Drawing Rights (approximately $135,000) ....
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two principal goals of the Warsaw Convention, one of which is
the limitation of the carriers' liability:
The Convention had two primary goals: first, to establish uni-
formity in the aviation industry with regard to the procedure for
dealing with claims arising out of international transportation
and the substantive law applicable to such claims, as well as with
regard to documentation such as tickets and waybills; second-
clearly the overriding purpose- to limit air carriers' potential liability in
the event of accidents.2
The Warsaw Convention and its first two amendments (Hague
Protocol of 1955 and Guatemala City Protocol of 1971) state
that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by passengers
is limited to a certain amount of money.'13
However, there were two possibilities by which the passenger
could break the limits provided by the Warsaw Convention. The
first of these is expressly provided for in the Convention, while
the second is the product of judicial interpretation. 4 Only the
second possibility is a subject of this article.
B. FIRST POSSIBILITY (WILLFUL MISCONDUCT)
Article 25 of Warsaw Convention provides that:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the dam-
age is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his
Letter of President William J. Clinton Approving The Montreal Convention, at
www.cargolaw.com/presentaions-montreal-cli.html#clinton-letter#clinton-let-
ter (last visited on February 18, 2004) (emphasis added).
12 Allan I. Mendelsohn & Renee Lieux, The Warsaw Convention Article 28, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and The Foreign Plaintiff 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 75,
77 (2003) (quoting In re Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988,
928 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added).
13 Warsaw limited the liability to 8,300 Special Drawing Rights ("SDR"), Hague
Protocol of 1955 to 16,600 SDR, the 1966 IATA Inter-Carrier Agreement to
$75,000 with absolute liability, Guatemala City Protocol to unbreakable limit of
100,000 SDR. Montreal 1999 set the limit to 100,000 SDR with an absolute liabil-
ity on the part of the carrier of more than 100,000 SDR if negligence is proven
[Article 21]. Montreal 1999, supra note 3, at art. 21. This may be the reason why
the requirement for the delivery of a passenger ticket to the passenger in Mon-
treal 1999 is not attached to the loss of the carrier's limitation of liability. The
same may be the reason for the deletion of the passenger's requirement of proof
of willful misconduct to break the limit, as required by the previous conventions
and protocols.
14 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463,
1471-72 (D.D.C. 1985).
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part, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct."a
The Hague and Guatemala City Protocols amended Warsaw
Article 25 to require a higher burden of proof of willful miscon-
duct, principally because of the increase in the carrier's limita-
tion of liability. 6
Thus, if a passenger could prove the injury suffered was
caused by the willful misconduct (called "dot' in the French text
of Warsaw) of the carrier or the carrier's agents, the passenger
could exceed the limit provided by the convention, and the pas-
senger could recover a higher amount of damages from the car-
rier in the court of the country where the suit is brought.17 It is
the passenger's onus to prove the presence of willful miscon-
duct, not the carrier's to prove the absence thereof."i
C. SECOND POSSIBILITY (INADEQUATE NOTICE)
1. Introduction
The second possibility for breaking the limit for liability, es-
tablished by judicial interpretation, was based on the ticket and
notice requirements of Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention.
Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention reads:
1. For the transportation of the passengers, the carrier must de-
liver a passenger ticket which shall contain the following
particulars:
a) the place and date of issue
b) the place of departure and of destination
c) the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of ne-
cessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration
shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of
its international character
d) the name and address of the carrier or carriers
e) a statement that the transportation is subject to rules relat-
ing to liability established by this convention.
2. The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or validity of the contract of transpor-
tation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this
convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered, he shall not
15 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25.
16 LOWENFELD, supra note 11, at 100-01.
17 Id.
18 Grey v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955).
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be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability."
In 1955, the Warsaw Convention was amended, to some ex-
tent, by the so-called Hague Protocol. Article 3 was one of those
articles that was amended. Sub-Article 2 reads:
The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
conclusion and conditions of the contract of carriage. The ab-
sence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket does not affect
the existence or validity of the contract of carriage which shall,
none the less, be subject to the rules of this convention. Never-
theless, if, with the consent of the carrier, the passenger embarks
without a passenger ticket having been delivered, or if the ticket
does not include the notice required by paragraph- (c) of this
Article, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of Article 22 [emphasis added].2 '
Article 3(2) of Warsaw had, for a long time, been explained
by aviation scholars and courts to mean that if the carrier ac-
cepts a passenger:
i. without a ticket;
ii. with a ticket that does not contain the list provided in Article
3(1); or
iii. with a ticket that was not "adequately delivered" to the pas-
senger (i.e.,) ticket that was not delivered in due time;2
19 It can be inferred from this provision that the purpose of the delivery of a
ticket to the passenger is the limitation or exclusion of liability, which is one of
the foundations of the Warsaw convention. See supra notes 3, 4.
20 Notice that the Hague Protocol provides that the failure of the carrier to
deliver a ticket to the passenger results only in the loss of the benefits of Article
22, i.e., limitation of liability; whereas Warsaw Article 3(2) refers to the provisions
that limit and exclude liability. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at War-
saw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 372, art. 3(b)(2). Thus,
while a Warsaw carrier that did not deliver a ticket cannot limit or exclude its liability,
a Hague carrier that did not deliver a ticket can nevertheless exclude its liability. War-
saw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3(2).
21 Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 816 (1965). In this case, the court held that delivery of a ticket on board
the airline several miles after takeoff was not considered to be delivered on time
because it prevented the passenger from duly seeking other means of protecting
any damage that may be caused during the flight, for instance purchasing insur-
ance. Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965). The "virtu-
ally unnoticeable and unreadable" print size of the ticket was another reason for
the holding. Id.
In Warren, the United States government contracted with the Flying Tiger Line
to transport ninety-two troops to Vietnam in March 1962. Id. at 495. Upon arri-
val at the airport, each soldier received a boarding ticket. Id. at 496. A soldier
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ticket that was not delivered to the proper person; 22 or partic-
ularly "without notice' of the application of the convention), 23
the carrier could not avail himself of the provisions of the con-
vention limiting or excluding liability.
The fact in element (i) is relatively easy to apply as it is de-
rived from a literal reading of the Convention's text. Elements
(ii) and (iii) are, however, derivatives of judicial interpreta-
tion.24 Courts have long read Article 3(2) of Warsaw to incorpo-
rate a concept that the carrier should not only deliver a ticket
with a notice of the convention's applicability (in order to ex-
clude or limit liability) but also should deliver the ticket in due
had to show this ticket before he was allowed to board. Id. The ticket did not
conform to the Warsaw Convention, since the Warsaw limitation was printed on
the back in fine print that was difficult to read without a magnifying glass. Id. at
497. The plane made intermediate stops in Hawaii, Wake Island, and Guam. Id.
It disappeared after leaving Guam on route to the Philippines and was never
heard from again. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit noted that the tickets con-
tained a warning that was in fine print, the court chose not to consider this in
their final decision. Id. (However, since this was a pre-Montreal Agreement case,
the ten-point type size requirement was not yet established.) Instead, the Ninth
Circuit focused its analysis on the question of delivery: After delivery of the
ticket, was there enough time for the soldiers to obtain other insurance coverage
beyond the Warsaw limits? Id. at 497-98. The Ninth Circuit ignored the fact that
the plane made several stops where the soldiers could have bought additional
insurance and ruled that the tickets were not delivered in such a manner as to
allow the troops an opportunity to obtain additional insurance. Id. at 498. The
Ninth Circuit apparently believed the delivery question alone was enough to re-
solve the matter.
In Warren and Mertens, the courts moved away from the technical meaning of
delivery of a ticket, which served as the basis for the decision in Ross, and consid-
ered whether the ticket was delivered in such a fashion as to allow the passengers
an opportunity to obtain extra insurance after receiving the ticket. If delivery did
not afford such an opportunity, then there was no delivery of a ticket pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention. The rulings from Warren and Mertens were expanded by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966). See Moore, infra note 42, at 235-36.
22 In Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 85 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1949), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 947 (1955), the court held that delivery of a ticket to an agent who exercised
the duty of purchasing the tickets and delivering them to a group of performers,
often on board the airplane, was proper enough to be considered as a delivery to
the plaintiff who claimed that the ticket was not delivered to her according to
Article 3 of Warsaw Convention. Ross, decided by the NewYork Court of Appeals,
was the gate opener for the so called American Rule, infra note 40, of interpret-
ing Warsaw Convention. See Moore, infra note 42, at 234-35.
23 LOWENFELD, supra note 11, at 55, 81-98.
24 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1471
(D.D.C. 1985).
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time,2 5 to the proper person," ' and in such a manner that the
passenger could inform himself of the ticket's contents.
2 7
Element iii(c) is the issue that this article will address in
depth. The celebrated Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.P.A.
case is a good illustration.8
2. The Lisi Case
Five suits were consolidated in the Southern District of New
York Court for wrongful death, personal injuries, and property
damage suffered by thirteen passengers of Alitalia's airplane
that crashed on February 26, 1960, shortly after takeoff from
Shannon, Ireland, on a Rome-New York trip.2"
During the trial, Alitalia moved the court to order limitation
of its liability by raising all the Warsaw defenses that limit or
exclude a carrier's liability."' The plaintiffs replied that the car-
rier's liability should not be limited because proper notice of the
applicability of Warsaw was not duly given to them by Alitalia as
required by Article 3(2) of the Convention.3" The dispute re-
volved around the size of the ticket's text given to the passengers
- a 4-point size print text. The plaintiffs argued that the size of
the print of the text of the ticket was so small as not to be rea-
sonably noticeable by a passenger. Thus, the ticket did not meet
the Warsaw Article 3(2) notice requirement.12
25 Mertens, 341 F.2d at 856.
2(i Ross, 85 N.E.2d at 884.
27 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the War-
saw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 513-514 (1967). In the Hague Conference
of September 1955, the United States cautioned the delegates about the size of
the text of the ticket that notifies the passenger of the limitation of liability mat-
ters. The United States proposed that the Standard Warsaw ticket (displayed on
LOWENFELD, supra note 11, at 93) be amended in such a way that the "warning be
more specific and in letters at least one-half centimeter high," but these efforts
had failed to persuade the delegates. The relevance of the size of the letters in
the notice ticket was not an issue until the Lisi case made the same an issue.
More than a decade later, in the Montreal Inter-Carrier Agreement of 1966 (an
agreement that prevented the withdrawal of the United States from Warsaw), the
United States' proposal was accepted and carriers engaged in international air
transports to, from, or stopping by the United States agreed to give a notice typed
in not less that 10 point text size with contrasting colors.
21 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.P.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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The trial court (Judge MacMahon) stated that the Warsaw
Convention limitation on liability was advantageous to the car-
rier and that the ordinary way for the carrier to get the benefit
of the limitations and exclusions of liability was to give a notice
to the passenger that the transport would be bound by the con-
vention's liability rules. 3 The court referred to the holdings in
Mertens and Warren,3 4 in which delivery of a ticket on board after
several miles in the air and delivery of a ticket at the ramp foot
of the airplane respectively, were held to be inadequate notices
of the applicability of the limitations of liability under Warsaw.
The court reasoned that a properly communicated ticket notice
would enable a passenger to guard himself against the very low
amount of Warsaw damages payable in accident cases by addi-
tionally purchasing flight insurance. 35 Hence, in effect, the stan-
dard the court took for checking the adequateness of the notice
was whether the notice of limitation was properly communi-
cated to the passenger so that the passenger might have a rea-
sonable opportunity to take self-protective measures. 6
Moving to the details of the case, the trial court stated that the
statements of "notice" in the ticket given to the passengers on
their ticket and baggage check were "virtually invisible... inef-
fectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unemphasized by
bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else. The simple
truth is that they [were] so artfully camouflaged that their pres-
ence [was] concealed. ' 37 In so concluding, the trial court also
criticized the rather vague way in which the notice was drafted. 8
The court of appeals rejected (with a strong dissent by Circuit
Judge Moore,39 a dissent that would later be used as the founda-
33 Id. at 239.
34 Id. at 243; see text supra, note 21.
35 Id. at 239.
36 This being the interpretation of the court, Professor Lowenfeld states that
the Warsaw preparatory meetings state that the purpose of Article 3(2) of Warsaw
was "to provide an incentive (by threat of sanction) to bring all airlines to adopt
the same form of ticket." LOWENFELD, supra note 11, at 96. However, the writer
agrees with the sensible and pragmatic interpretation adopted by the court.
Moreover, since one of the basic objectives of Warsaw 1929 was to limit air carri-
ers' potential liability in the event of accidents, the court's interpretation is in
line with the reasoning that the passengers should reasonably be informed of the
low amount of damage recoverable under Warsaw 1929, so that the passengers
can get other protective measures.
37 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.P.A., 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
38 Id.
39 Judge Moore stated that:
260
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tion for reversing the Lisi-Mertens-Warren line of interpretation in
another case) Alitalia's defense that the passengers were given
an Article 3 notice. The appellate court affirmed.4"
The ruling in Lisi brought considerable opposition from some
Warsaw signatories and IATA, which, together with Alitalia, peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. An
equally divided Supreme Court affirmed.4' With Lisi and similar
court decisions as a background, the United States led IATA and
a number of carriers to agree to the 1966 Montreal Inter-Carrier
Agreement ("1966 Agreement"), among the provisions of which
was the size of the print of the notice to be given to the
passengers.
The majority in their opinion indulge in judicial treaty-making...
the majority do not approve of the terms of the treaty and, there-
fore, by judicial fiat they rewrite it... [w]ere actual notice to be the
requirement, every airline would have to have its agents explain to
every passenger the legal effect of the treaty and, in all probability,
insist that each passenger be represented by counsel who would
certif- that he had explained the import of the Convention to his
client who, in turn, both understood and agreed to the limitation.
See In re Korean Air Lines disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1472
(D.D.C. 1985).
40 The Appellate Court quoted, as an example, a Department of Transporta-
tion (formerly the Civil Aeronautics Board) Economic Regulation, 14 C.F.R.
§ 211.175 (1963), circulated to all United States air carriers and foreign air carri-
ers which wanted to avail themselves of the exclusions and liabilities of Warsaw to
include the following statement in at least as large as ten point modern type and in ink
contrasting with the stock on each ticket:
Advice to International Passengers on Limitation of Liability
Passengers embarking upon a journey involving an ultimate desti-
nation or stop in a country other than the country of departure are
advised that the provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Conven-
tion may be applicable to their entire journey including the portion
entirely within the countries of departure and destination. The
Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers
to passengers for death or personal injury to approximately $8,290
and limits liability for loss or damage to baggage.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing insur-
ance from a private company. Such insurance is not affected by any
limitation of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Convention.
For further information please consult your airline or insurance
company representative
14 C.F.R. § 211.175 (1963) (emphasis added).
41 Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.P.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
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3. Korean Air Lines
The interpretation of Warsaw Article 3(2) followed the above
mentioned analysis until the Korean Air Lines case of 1989
brought a reversal to the Lisi-Mertens-Warren line of holdings.
The courts had hitherto held that there was a concept of "ade-
quate notice" in Article 3(2) whereby the air carrier ought to
deliver a ticket:
* that contains all the elements contained in Article 3(1);
* in due time;
" to the proper person; and
* that contains a notice of the applicability of the convention
in such a readable size and manner as to inform an average
passenger.
Apart from this, the carrier would lose the benefit of the provi-
sions of the convention on exclusion or limitation of liability.
This ruling was called the American Rule.4 2
The issue concerning the status in Warsaw Article 3(2) of the
size of the notice was not only a debate in the United States but
also in the countries of other Warsaw members. In Canada, the
Canadian Supreme Court made a final ruling on this issue in
Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. that was decided ten
years before the United States Supreme Court reversed the Lisi
holding in the Korean Air Lines case."
In Ludecke, the Canadian Supreme Court decided that the de-
livery of a ticket with a small size of the notice text was not con-
sidered a non-delivery under Article 3(2) of the Warsaw
Convention.44 In that case, the airline gave the plaintiff passen-
ger a 41/2 size notice in the ticket.45 After an injury was suffered
by the plaintiff, the issue arose as to whether the small size of the
notice text was tantamount to non-delivery of a ticket, thus deny-
ing the defendant the benefit of limited liability.46 The Cana-
dian Supreme Court, referring to the American cases which, in
similar circumstances, held that this was a case of non-delivery,
stated that the American Courts strayed from the literal reading
of Warsaw Article 3(2), which denied the carrier the benefits of
42 Larry Moore, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: The United States Supreme Court
Eliminates the American Rule to the Warsaw Convention, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 229, 229-30 (1990).
43 Ludecke v. Can. Pac. Airlines, Ltd. [1979] 98 D.L.R. 3d 52 (Can.).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 55.
46 Id. at 56.
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limitation of liability only when a ticket was not delivered at all. "7
The Canadian Supreme Court reasoned that the American
Courts, in holding against the carriers in such cases, were re-
sponding to the view in the United States that the liability limits
in the conventions on international transportation by air were
too low.4" By so holding, the United States courts were improp-
erly subjecting the carriers to unlimited liability.49 Admitting
that the Warsaw limitation of liability was extremely low, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court nevertheless held that the airline gave
an adequate notice to the passengers, and it saw no reason why
it should hold that a ticket was "not delivered." The plaintiff's
claim was denied.
Back to the United States.
On September 1, 1983, a Boeing airplane owned by Korean
Air Line (KAL), on a New York-Seoul route (KAL 007), acciden-
tally strayed into the Soviet Union air zone, was shot down by
Soviet Union military aircraft, and crashed into the Sea ofJapan,
killing all the 269 passengers and crew on board.'
The tickets delivered to the passengers contained a notice
that the Warsaw Convention applied to that international trans-
portation. ' The notice, however, appeared in 8-point type in-
stead of a 10-point type required by the 1966 Agreement.51
The passengers sued in a number of courts, and the suits were
consolidated to a pre-trial hearing before the District Court for
the District of Columbia (Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr.). Since
the flight was from the United States to South Korea (both be-
ing members to the Warsaw Convention, although South Korea
joined Warsaw by assenting to the Montreal Protocol of 1975),
the fact that the flight was an international transport according
to Article 1 of Warsaw was not an issue) 4
The main issue was "whether the failure to print notice to passengers
of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention in 10-point modern type
47 Id. at 57-58.
48 Id. at 56.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 57-58.
51 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 123 (1989).
, d. at 124.
53 Id.
,4 Id. at 122.
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size, as required by the Montreal Agreement, strips the carrier of the Con-
vention's liability limitation."55
After the Lisi-Mertens-Warren cases, decisions that preceded the
1966 Agreement, United States courts had been strictly follow-
ing the American Rule.56 The district court in this case, however,
reversed the American Rule and decided that a failure to give a
10-point size notice was not a cause that would deny the carrier
the benefit of the limitations and exclusions of liability under
Warsaw.57 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted that the size of the type did not comport with the 1966
Agreement, but upheld the district court's denial of the plain-
tiffs motion to remove the Warsaw Convention's protection.58
As later framed by the Supreme Court, the resolution of the
issue depended on an answer given to the question of whether
the failure to give a notice fell under the first or second sentence
of Warsaw Article 3(2). This reads:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not
affect the existence or validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this conven-
tion [First Sentence] ."
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passen-
ger ticket having been delivered, he shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or
limit his liability [Second Sentence] .60
The Supreme Court correctly stated that any fact matter that
fell under the first sentence did not have an effect on the appli-
cability of the convention's rules limiting or excluding liability
because the ticket remained valid.61 If, however, the fact matter
55 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. at 1463, 1464
(D.D.C. 1985) (emphasis added).
56 Chan, 490 U.S. at 124, 127-128 (citing Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
234 N.E.2d 199 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968) (where 4 1/2 point text
was enough ground to revoke the Warsaw limit despite the fact that the passenger
had bought two insurance policies of $75,000 value)); Deutsche Lufthansa Ak-
tiengesellschaft v. Cival Aeronautics Bd., 479 F.2d 912, 917-18 (1973); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, cert. denied sub
nom; Polskie Linie Lotnicze v. Robles, 464 U.S. 845 (1983) (where the size of the
text was 8 1/2 points) [arranged chronologically by the writer]). See also In reAir
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.
1986) (where the size of the text was 9 points).
57 In re Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1466-67.
58 Moore, supra note 42, at 237-38.
59 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
60 Id.
61 Chan, 490 U.S. at 1680-82.
264
2006] MONTREAL CONVENTION 265
is one that fell under the second sentence, then the carrier
would lose the benefit of the exclusion or limitation of
liability.
62
The refined issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was
whether the delivery of an 8-point notice on a passenger ticket
would be considered an irregularity (that would be of no effect
on the validity of the ticket: First Sentence) or a non-delivery of a
ticket (that would deny the carrier the benefits of the exclusion
or limitation of liability: Second Sentence)63
Although the Supreme Court decided to discuss this at the
end, a subsidiary issue was whether the 1966 Agreement could
be considered part of the Warsaw Convention. This is because
the passengers' claim was based on a requirement found in the
1966 Agreement.64 The Court held that the 1966 Agreement
was not an amendment to Warsaw and Warsaw contained no
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 The relevant provision of the 1966 Agreement reads:
Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket, furnish to
each passenger whose transportation is governed by the Conven-
tion ... the following notice, which shall be printed in type at least
as large as 10 point and in ink contrasting with the stock on (i)
each ticket; (ii) a piece of paper either placed in the ticket envel-
ope with the ticket or attached to the ticket; or (iii) on the ticket
envelope:
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER
ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Passengers on ajourney involving an ultimate destination or a stop
in a country other than the country of origin are advised that the
provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Convention may be ap-
plicable to the entire journey, including any portion entirely within
the country of origin or destination. For such passengers on ajour-
ney to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United States
of America, the Convention and special contracts of carriage em-
bodied in applicable tariffs provide that the liability of certain
(name the carrier) and certain other carriers parties to such special
contracts for death of or personal injury to passengers is limited in
most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $75,000 per pas-
senger, and that this liability up to such limit shall not depend on
negligence on the part of the carrier. For such passengers traveling
by a carrier not a party to such special contracts or on ajourney not
to, from, or having an agreed stopping place in the United States of
America, liability of the carrier for death or personal injury to pas-
sengers is limited in most cases to approximately US $8,290 or US
$16,580.
The names of Carriers parties to such special contracts are available
at all ticket offices of such carriers and may be examined on
request.
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provision on the size of the text of the notice. The Court stated,
in relevant part:
Petitioners here similarly contend that the Montreal Agreement
established a bright line which should be taken to define what
notice is adequate. I cannot accept this argument. [The Montreal
Agreement is a private agreement among airline companies, which can-
not and does not purport to amend the Warsaw Convention.] To be
sure, the Agreement was concluded under pressure from the
United States Government, which would otherwise have with-
drawn from the Warsaw Convention (emphasis added).65
If the court had addressed this issue at the beginning, there
would have been no need to further discuss Warsaw Article 3(2).
Thus, the court elected to discuss the 1966 Agreement together
with the Warsaw Convention.
The Court stated that the only way a carrier could lose the
benefit of the exclusion or limitation of liability was when a
ticket had not been delivered or when the carrier delivered a
ticket "whose shortcomings are so extensive that it cannot rea-
sonably be described as a 'ticket' (for example, a mistakenly de-
livered blank form, with no data filled in). 6 6  The Court
rejected the American Rule which held that failure to give an ade-
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing insur-
ance from a private company. Such insurance is not affected by any
limitation of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Convention or
such special contracts of carriage. For further information please
consult your airline or insurance company representative. Either
alternative may be used.
65 Chan, 490 U.S. at 150 (quoting Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 27)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court seems to have tacitly reversed the notion
in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983), where the defendant Polskie Linie
Lotnicze (LOT Polish Airlines) lost the protection of the Warsaw limitation and
exclusion because it gave the passengers an 8 1/2 point type. There the "court
found that the Montreal Agreement qualified as a 'special contract' under article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention and, as such, it effectively modified the Conven-
tion" and found for the passengers because the airline did not give a 10 point
type size notice as required by the Agreement. Id. at 88.
The same conclusion was reached in the next similar case, In reAir Crash Disas-
ter Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated
by, 490 U.S. 1032 (1982). In this case, the notice given was a 9 point size text.
Regardless, however, of the fact that there was a 1 point size difference with the
Montreal's 10 point requirement, the court denied the carrier a Warsaw limita-
tion benefit. Id. at 1095. In the Chan case, the Supreme Court gave the final
word on the status of the 1966 Agreement, reversing the trend of such holdings.
Chan, 490 U.S. at 125-26.
66 Chan, 490 U.S. at 129. The Court reversed the trend in which "[s]everal
courts have equated nondeliveiy of a ticket, for purposes of this provision, with the
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quate notice was tantamount to a ticket's non-delivery. The
Court expressed its clear intent to reverse the American Rule by
stating that "a delivered document does not fail to qualify as a
'passenger ticket,' and does not cause forfeiture of the damages
limitation, merely because it contains a defective notice. '" 7 In
other words, the Court was stating that a ticket's delivery with a
defective notice is a mere irregularity (under the First Sentence)
and not a non-delivery (under the Second Sentence). In so hold-
ing, the Court put an end to forty-one years of controversy on
the interpretation of Article 3(2) of Warsaw Convention."
Moreover, the Court mentioned that the 1966 Agreement did
not make the 10-point size notice a condition for the carrier's
protection by the exclusion and limitation provisions of
Warsaw.69
Although the concurring opinion discussed this in detail, Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the Court's majority, made an analogical
reference to the Warsaw's similar provisions that deal with bag-
gage checks and air waybills for cargo (Articles 4 and 8/9 re-
spectively) .7" These provisions state that the carrier shall not
avail itself of the provisions of Warsaw excluding or limiting car-
rier liability if the respective document does not contain a no-
tice that Warsaw applies (Article 4(4) and Article 9
respectively) .7  The Court read these similar provisions and
concluded that if the drafters wanted to make notice a condition
precedent for the carrier's benefit, as they expressly did for bag-
gage checks and air waybills for cargo, they could have done so
for passenger tickets.7"
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, however, indicated a willingness to retain the American
Rule in a modified version. If notice is indeed required, the con-
curring Justices stated, it must surely meet some minimal stan-
dards of "adequacy. ' '7' All would agree that notice that could be
read only with a magnifying glass would be no notice at all. For
the concurring Justices, there would be a substantial difference
delivety of a ticket in a form that fails to provide adequate notice of the Warsaw limita-
tion." Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 128.
68 Moore, supra note 42, at 238.
69 Chan, 490 U.S. at 150-51.
7o Id. at 133.
71 Id. at 132-33.
72 Id. at 130-33.
73 Id. at 149-50.
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between 4-point and 8-point type, particularly where, as in that
case, the notice reasonably met the requirement of the "advice"
prescribed by the 1966 Agreement and occupied a separate
page in the ticket book.14 For the concurring Justices, it could
not be concluded that the notice given here was "camouflaged
in Lilliputian print in a ticket of [other conditions]" as was so
held in Lisi.75
The concurring opinion also indicated that the Justices would
be willing to keep the question open as to what constitutes
proper notice in order to retain the right to prohibit inadequate
76notice. The Supreme Court majority, however, left no doubt
that lower courts must adhere to the Warsaw Convention strictly
and may not exploit minor technicalities to circumvent the con-
vention's limitation provisions. The American Rule was officially
dead as Justice Brennan wrote, "If I may paraphrase Justice
Harlan: I agree that the interpretation of the Warsaw Conven-
tion advanced by petitioners should be rejected, but I consider it
entitled to a more respectful burial than has been accorded."77
4. The Requirement of Notice under Montreal Convention of 1999
a. Background on Montreal Convention of 1999
In 1999, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
for International Carriage by Air Signed at Montreal on May 28,
1999 ("Montreal 1999") was agreed upon. Originally, fifty-eight
countries, including eighteen African countries, signed it and it
entered into effect on November 6, 2003, with thirty-five coun-
tries ratifying it thus far.
As narrated at the beginning of this article, the history of the
Warsaw Convention and the subsequent amendments to it, as
well as other inter-carrier agreements: (1) Hague Protocol of
1955; (2) the Guadalajara Convention of 1961; (3) the Montreal
Inter-Carrier Agreement of 1966 (based on Article 22 of War-
saw); (4) the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971; (5) the Montreal
Additional Protocols of 1975; and (6) the IATA Inter-carrier
Agreement of 1996 ("IATA 1996"), all revolved around the con-
cept of the limitation of liability applicable to the carriers. Obvi-
ously one of the foundational concepts of Montreal 1999 was
also the limitation of the carrier's liability.
74 Moore, supra note 42, at 238-39.
75 Chan, 490 U.S. at 149.
76 Id. at 151-52.
77 Chan, 490 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
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Following the 1966 Agreement that applied to international
transportation by air to, from, or with an agreed stopping place
in the United States, the IATA responded with IATA 1996 to the
international demand for the increase of the low Warsaw limit
and for a limit on the various defenses for the carriers available
in Warsaw. IATA 1996, signed by a number of carriers provided,
in relevant part:
1. {CARRIER} shall not invoke the limitation of liability in Arti-
cle 22(1) of the Convention as to any claim for recoverable com-
pensatory damages arising under Article 17 of the Convention.
2. {CARRIER} shall not avail itself of any defense under Article
20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such
claim which does not exceed 100,000 SDR [unless option 11(2) is
used].
3. Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof,
{CARRIER} reserves all defenses available under the Convention
to any such claim. With respect to third parties, the carrier also
reserves all rights of recourse against any other person, including
without limitation, rights of contribution and indemnity.
II. At the option of the carrier, its conditions of carriage and
tariffs also may include the following provisions:
1. {CARRIER} agrees that subject to applicable law, recoverable
compensatory damages for such claims may be determined by
reference to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of
the passenger. (lex loci domicili).
2. {CARRIER} (shall not avail itself of any defense under Article
20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such
claims which does not exceed 100,000 SDRs), except that such
waiver is limited to the amounts shown below for the routes indi-
cated, as may be authorized by governments concerned with the
transportation involved.7"
The crux of IATA 1996 was that the carriers would not, up to
a maximum passenger damage claim of 100,000 SDR
(equivalent to $135,000), argue that:
(1) the Warsaw Convention limit of 8,300 SDR applies to them;
or
(2) under Warsaw Article 22(1), they, or their agents, took all
the necessary measures to avoid damage or that it was impossible
for the carrier or its agents to take such measures.
78 IATA Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agree-
ment, Oct. 31, 1995, http://www.iata.org/NR/contentconnector/CS2OOO/sitein-
terface/sites/legal/file/mia.pdf.
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Thus, up to a maximum of 100,000 SDR, the passengers
would get compensation without proof of any kind, except ex-
tent of damage, against the carrier.
In May 1999, over 500 participants from 121 contracting
states, as well as one non-contracting state and eleven interna-
tional organizations took part in the three week conference
which witnessed the birth of Montreal 1999. The convention
was signed by fifty-two states, including eighteen African coun-
tries. The broad representation reflected the importance the
international aviation community had placed on adoption of an
updated regime for air carrier liability. During the three week
conference, there were divergent views among the participating
states.79 This was, however, resolved by a consensus package de-
veloped by a working group known as "The Friends of the Chair-
man." Montreal 1999 has fifty-seven Articles. Its main features
can be summarized as:
" the incorporation of the provisions of the Guadalajara Con-
vention and Montreal Protocol No 4 on cargo;
" the incorporation of the liability provisions of IATA 1996 on
passenger injury and death (i.e., a 100,000 SDR damage on
absolute liability basis and for unlimited damage beyond
100,000 SDR on the carrier's failure to prove absence of
negligence) (Article 21);
* the provisions requiring states to maintain adequate insur-
ance covering their liability under the convention (Article
50), thus assuring adequate insurance availability in cases of
automatic payments or litigation;
" though not mandated by the convention, carriers are
obliged to make advance payments in the case of accidents
causing passenger injury or death and speedy settlements
(upfront payments to prevent hardship);
* it relaxes prior requirements as to content of passenger
documentation and simplification or modernization of doc-
umentation related to passengers, baggage, and the cargo;
• it establishes the fifth jurisdiction (Article 33), an attempt
to increase the available forums for litigation from the four
provided in Warsaw cases to five. Legal action for damage
79 Id. The United States, supported by a number of Latin American countries,
primarily focused on the widest possible fifth jurisdiction. The European Union
had its focus on securing the most strategic unlimited liability, whereas the Afri-
can States, supported by Middle East and some developing nations, were keen to
preserve a balance of interest with a view to protecting their carriers.
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may be filed in the country where at the time of accident
the passenger has his or her principle and permanent resi-
dence (the fifth jurisdiction is the homeland of the passen-
ger subject to other conditions);
* there is no clear provision for recovery of damages for
mental injury of passengers;
" it replaces six different legal instruments, collectively
known as the Warsaw System;
" under article 24, there is a provision for review of liability
limits every five years.80
Of relevance to this article are the provisions of Montreal
1999 that deal with the limitation of carrier liability and damage,
as well as those related to the requirement of notice to passen-
gers. As discussed in the sections above, the history of Warsaw
and interpretation of its Article 3(2) dealt with the relationship
between the limitation of the carrier's liability and the notice
given to the passengers regarding the applicability of the Con-
vention to the air carriage. It was also discussed that the Cana-
dian and the United States Supreme Courts interpreted Warsaw
Article 3(2) literally and held that the carrier loses the benefit of
Warsaw liability limitations only when it did not deliver a ticket
to the passenger. 1 The concept of willful misconduct was also
discussed at the beginning of this article, and it was mentioned
there that the carrier could also be subjected to unlimited liabil-
ity when it, or its agents, were engaged in an act of willful
misconduct.
The principal reason for providing the two grounds for escap-
ing the Warsaw liability limitation (i.e., non-delivery of a ticket
with a notice and willful misconduct) was to ease opposition to
the very low limit of damages available under Warsaw. In an
incident of injury where one passenger was a Warsaw passenger
and the other was not, the non-Warsaw passenger could recover
greater damages than the Warsaw passenger if the forum coun-
try's national law provides for a higher amount.8 2 Thus, Warsaw
11 Id. at 2-3.
81 The concurring opinion in the Chan case, it is worth remembering, stated,
nevertheless, that in cases of flagrantly inadequate notices (for example a notice
of such a text size that could only be read with the assistance of a magnifier), they
would assimilate such notices with non-delivery. Chan, 490 U.S. at 150. In fact,
unlike the Canadian Supreme Court case quoted above, the concurring opinion
stated that there would be a difference on its holding if it was presented with a 4-
point text size than an 8-point size text as in Chan. See Moore, supra note 42.
82 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 158 (1999).
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passengers were given these two grounds to escape the Warsaw
principles of low damage and proof of fault for recovery.
It is easy to conclude, then, that if the amount of damages
recoverable in an international transport by air were increased,
there would be no need for passengers to seek out grounds to
escape the Warsaw limits.83 This is what was achieved in Mon-
treal 1999; the Warsaw limit of 8,300 SDR was raised by a factor
of about twelve to 100,000 SDR.8 4 The major difference be-
tween Warsaw (as amended) and Montreal 1999, however, is the
adoption in Montreal 1999 of unlimited liability above 100,000
SDR if the carrier fails to prove absence of negligence on its part
or if the carrier proves negligence of a third party as the sole
cause of the damage. 5
When the ICAO authorized its Legal Bureau to "modernize"
the Warsaw system, the principal issue for all members and carri-
ers was the limitation of liability. 6 It was agreed by all partici-
pants in the conference and during the meetings that led to
Montreal 1999 that the Warsaw system of presumed fault, break-
able only upon proof by the passenger of willful misconduct or
gross negligence, was a pro-carrier doctrine. 7 The participants
in the drafting history of Montreal 1999 agreed that Warsaw was
designed to assist the infant air carrier industry of the early War-
saw days.88 With the astronomical growth of the airline industry
in all dimensions, however, the Warsaw doctrine of low liability,
breakable only upon proof of fault, was untenable given the re-
alities of the late twentieth century air transport industry.8"
Thus, from the inception of the Warsaw modernization move-
ment, all participants agreed:
" to increase the amount of damages recoverable; and
" to shift the orientation of international air transport law
from a pro-carrier to a pro-consumer stance, which could
easily be achieved by altering the law governing liability.
83 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 505 (1967) (at the Hague Conference,
raising the liability limit was inextricably linked with revising Article 25 dealing
with the carrier's willful misconduct).
84 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, at art. 21.
85 Id.
86 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], International Conference on Air Law, vol. 1 at
1 & vol. 2 at 71, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2 (1999) [hereinafter Convention Minutes].
87 Lowenfeld, supra note 11, at 499-500.
88 ICAO, Status of Warsaw Convention System, at 2, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10381
(1996).
89 Id. at 2.
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Referring to and emboldened by the 1966 and 1996 Inter-car-
rier Agreements, the drafters established a new doctrine of lia-
bility. The Convention's first draft,9° prepared by the Legal
Bureau, was presented to the Secretariat of the ICAO on June
10-12, 1996. Similar to the present Montreal 1999, the main fea-
tures of the draft included:
(1) making the convention a consolidated instrument replac-
ing all the previous Warsaw-series Conventions and
Protocols;
(2) implementing a new regime of liability similar to that con-
tained in the IATA 1996, (specifically an absolute liability
for the first 100,000 SDR and unlimited liability if the car-
rier failed to prove that it or its agents were not at fault or
negligent and that it took necessary measures to avoid
damages);
(3) changing documentation requirements;
(4) adding a fifth jurisdiction to the four Warsaw fora men-
tioned in Warsaw Article 28(1); and
(5) retaining of the notice requirement along the lines of the
Hague Protocol."
Of particular concern to this article are the second and fifth
points of the above-mentioned features of the draft.
The drafters made it clear that they were eliminating the will-
ful misconduct element of Warsaw while retaining the notice re-
quirement.92 The reason for eliminating willful misconduct can
be inferred from the elimination of limits of liability.
As for the delivery of ticket and notice requirements, the par-
ticipants noticed that with the progress of technology, "ticketless
travel" was a possibility. Burdening carriers with a Warsaw Arti-
cle 3(2) second sentence-like requirement was not going to be
practical. On the other hand, the drafters were cautious of the
fact that some concrete documentary evidence was needed as
90 ICAO, Draft of New Warsaw Instrument, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10470 (1996)
[hereinafter Instrument to Modernize].
91 Id. at A/2-3.
92 ICAO, Report on Modernization of the Warsaw System, at 3, ICAO Doc. C-WP/
10381 (1996) ("Under this proposed mechanism, full recovery of damages sus-
tained is no longer predicated upon proof of willful misconduct on the part of
the air carrier since it is sufficient to establish the required element of negligence
in order to be compensated.").
93 Convention Minutes, supra note 86, vol. 1 at 56 (The United Kingdom noted
that "[t]he existence and validity of the contract of carriage existed indepen-
dently of [Article 3].").
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proof of the air carriage.9 a Thus, to stand on the middle
ground, they resolved to make the requirements of delivery of a
document of carriage and notice of the applicability of the con-
vention requirements compulsory upon the carrier without de-
priving the carrier of the benefit of limitation of liability
provided in the new convention if there was no delivery.9 5
This was a wonderful balance of interests. It was discussed ear-
lier that Warsaw had two grounds for denying the carrier the
benefit of limiting or excluding liability: willful misconduct and
non-delivery of a ticket.96 By eliminating proof of willful miscon-
duct and raising the strict liability limit to 100,000 SDR, the
drafters tightened the grip on the carrier. By removing the non-
delivery of a ticket as a second ground for benefiting unlimited
liability, however, the drafters left the passengers with a single
ground to escape the 100,000 SDR limit (i.e., if the carrier fails
to prove absence of negligence on its part).
With this compromise as a background, the succeeding drafts
and Montreal Conferences were left with one issue: drafting the
new liability regime in a way that places the burden on the car-
rier.9" Removing the non-delivery of a ticket as a ground for
breaking the limit was not made an issue from the first draft in
1996 until the signing of Montreal 1999.
b. Montreal 1999 on Delivery of Ticket
Article 3 of Montreal, as we read it today, was copied, with a
small but significant change, from the Hague Protocol Article
III that modified Article 3 of Warsaw. 98 Article III of the Hague
Protocol reads:
In respect of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be delivered
containing:
c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves
an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the coun-
try of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and
94 Id. vol. 1 at 57 (Canada requested that the passenger be given written notice
prior to departure).
95 Id. (France supported the position of Lebanon "in that there must be a bal-
ance between the rights of the carrier to promote the use of modern technology
in the issuance of tickets, and protection of the rights of the passenger.").
96 See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
97 Convention Minutes, supra note 86, vol. 1 at 84-96 (discussing the liability lim-
its in Article 20).
98 Compare Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 3, with Hague, supra note 3, art. 3.
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that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability
of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of
or damage to baggage.
2. The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the conclusion and conditions of the contract of carriage. The
absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket does not af-
fect the existence or validity of the contract of carriage which
shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this Convention.
Nevertheless, if, with the consent of the carrier, the passenger embarks
without a passenger ticket having been delivered, or if the ticket does not
include the notice required by paragraph 1 c) of this Article, the carrier
shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of Article 22."
Article 3 of Montreal reads:
1. In respect of carriage of passengers, an individual or collective
document of carriage shall be delivered containing ....
2. Any other means which preserves the information contained
in paragraph I may be substituted for the delivery of the docu-
ment ....
3. The passenger shall be given written notice to the effect that where this
Convention is applicable it governs and may limit the liability of carri-
ers in respect of death or injury and . . . for delay.
4. Non-compliance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs
shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of
carriage, which shall, nonetheless, be subject to the rules of
this Convention including those relating to limitation of liability.
Unlike in the Hague Protocol, where non-delivery of a ticket
or with no (or inadequate) notice deprived the carrier of the
advantage of Article 22,1... in Montreal 1999, non-delivery of a
document (or delivery of a document without a notice) does not
deprive the carrier of the benefits of the limitation provided in
Article 21(1) of Montreal 1999.' ° Thus, the only ground
whereby the carrier can be subjected to unlimited liability is
when the carrier cannot prove absence of negligence on its part
or that the negligence of a third party is the sole cause of the
damage (Article 21(2) of Montreal 1999).t12
99 Hague, supra note 3, at art. 3 (emphasis added).
I o Id.
I'l Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 3.
1(12 Id. art. 21.
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c. What is the Effect of Montreal 1999 on the
Lisi-Warren-Mertens-Chan line of cases?
It was discussed earlier that the United States and Canadian
Supreme Courts finally held, on Warsaw Article 3(2), that it was
only when the carrier did not deliver a ticket that the passenger
could claim damages above the limit provided. 10 3  Montreal
1999, however, shut that door by stating clearly that non-delivery
of a travel document does not affect the provisions of the con-
vention relating to liability.10 4 By providing this principle, Mon-
treal 1999 took the Lisi-Warren-Mertens line of interpretation a
step further than that provided in the Chan interpretation. In
Chan, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Article 3(2)
of Warsaw as stating that only non-delivery of a ticket could deny
the carrier the benefit of limitation or exclusion of liability; 10 5
Montreal 1999 dropped even that possibility. 10 6 It seems that the
drafters included the phrase "including those relating to limita-
tion of liability"'1 7 to clarify that the Warsaw effect of non-deliv-
ery of a ticket was eliminated by Montreal 1999.108
The reader must note that in Montreal 1999 Article 3(5), par-
ticular reference is made to the provisions of the convention re-
lating to the limitation of liability but not to those relating to
exoneration from liability.109 An issue that may be raised with the
wording of Article 3(5) of Montreal 1999 is whether the omis-
sion of a reference to the provisions of the convention relating
to exclusion (exoneration) of liability has any effect on the pas-
senger or carrier. In other words, would it make a difference if
103 See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
104 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 3.
105 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128-29 (1989).
106 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 3.
107 Id.
108 The preparatory documents and the notes on the drafting history of Article
3(5) of Montreal 1999 do not tell why the drafters added the phrase "including
those relating to limitation of liability" at the end of the paragraph. Moreover,
the reader must be aware of the use of the phrase "limitation of liability" in Mon-
treal 1999-a convention that provided for unlimited liability. By "limitation of
liability," the drafters mean the 100,000 SDR strict liability provided for in Article
21(1). Therefore, in cases where the carrier does not deliver a travel document
or delivers a travel document with no notice of the applicability of the conven-
tion, and the carrier makes a successful Article 21(2) defense, the carrier will be
liable only to the strict liability of 100,000 SDR. This is the meaning of "limita-
tion of liability" in Article 3(5) of Montreal 1999; thus, the phrase should not be
used to infer limited liability under Montreal 1999.
100 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 3.
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the phrase read "including those relating to limitation or exclu-
sion of liability"?'"
It seems clear that the answer is no. If the drafters clearly
indicated that the rules of the convention, including the limita-
tion of liability, apply even where a ticket is not delivered, then it
also means that non-delivery of a ticket has no effect on the ap-
plicability of the rule on the exclusion of liability which is found
in Article 20 of Montreal 1999.
It may be argued, on the other hand, that if the drafters used
the language "the contract of carriage ... shall, nonetheless, be
subject to the rules of this Convention" and then added the
phrase "including those relating to limitation of liability," they
did not mean that they were referring to the whole convention
when they used the phrase "the rules of this Convention." If
they were referring to the whole Convention, there would be no
need to insert the phrase "including those relating to limitation
of liability;" it would be superfluous. Therefore, by "the rules of
this Convention," the drafters meant the rules of the convention
related to the effect of delivery or non-delivery of a travel docu-
ment, the most obvious being the limitation or exclusion of lia-
bility."' It has been discussed in the sections above that
exclusion and limitation of liability are inseparable concepts;
hence, a reference only to limitation of liability was intended to
exclude the exclusion of liability. An obvious conclusion is that
the carriers may not exclude their liability under Article 20 if
they have not delivered a travel document.' 12
110 Please note that the second sentence of Warsaw Article 3(2) deprived the
carrier of the benefits of the provisions of the Convention that limit or exclude
liability. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 3. Hague Protocol, to which
Montreal 1999 is closer, however, deprived the carrier only of the benefit of Arti-
cle 22 (limitation of liability) from which one can infer that in all circumstances
(i.e., whether a ticket was delivered or not) the carrier had the benefit of arguing
on the provisions excluding liability except, of course, when the carrier is not
liable for willful misconduct under Hague. Hague, supra note 3, art. 3.
11 See, for example, that Article 17(1), a liability Article, uses the clause: "the
carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability. Montreal 1999, supra
note 3, art. 21 (emphasis added).
112 An opposite conclusion was made by the writer in the analogous Article in
the Hague Protocol that refers only to the limitation of liability. See discussion
supra note 110. This is because the failure to deliver a ticket has an opposite
consequence in Hague and Montreal 1999: in Hague, the carrier would lose the
benefit of limitation of liability but in Montreal 1999, it cannot. Similarly, if in
Hague, the carrier would not lose the benefit of exclusion of liability if a ticket was not
delivered (a loss of the benefit of limitation being certain), but in Montreal 1999, in
accordance with the second interpretation of the phrase "including those relating to limita-
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It is submitted, however, that the second interpretation devi-
ates from the spirit of Montreal 1999, a convention which tried
to benefit the carriers against the increase in liability and the
shift in the burden of proof of liability.
Nevertheless, Montreal 1999 requires that notice of the appli-
cability of the Convention should be given to the passengers.1"
The non-compliance with this mandatory requirement will not
have any effect on the applicability of the provisions on limita-
tion of liability.'" 4 The writer is not aware of any significant ef-
fect that such non-compliance may have on the carrier because
non-compliance always has had the effect of depriving the car-
rier of the benefits of limitation or exclusion of liability, such an
effect being eliminated by Montreal 1999. The effect of non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Article 3 (1)-
(4) of Montreal 1999 remains to be seen. But since the notice is
a mandatory requirement, the writer believes that the wording
of the notice will be similar to that of Warsaw and may read:
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a
stop in a country other than the country of origin are advised
that the provisions, including those related to limitation of liabil-
ity, of a treaty known as the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage By Air, signed at
Montreal on May 28, 1999, may be applicable to the entire jour-
ney, including any portion entirely within the country of origin
or destination.1 15
d. Montreal 1999 on Willful Misconduct
Article 21 of Montreal 1999 states:
1. For damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17116 not
exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the
carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability.
tion of liability" in Article 3(5), the carrier will lose the benefit of exclusion of liability (the
benefit of limitation of liability being preserved).
-3 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 3.
114 See supra note 110 on the meaning of the phrase "limitation of liability"
under Article 3(5) of Montreal 1999.
115 ANDREA F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-93 (2d ed.
1981).
116 "The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury
of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or
injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations




2. the carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under para-
graph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger
100,000 Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or
agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of a third party (emphasis
added).' 17
The crux of the line of analysis of this part of the article is in
paragraph 1 of Article 21. In that paragraph, the drafters used
language similar to that used in Warsaw Article 25:
1. The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on
his part ....
2. Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said
provisions if the damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent .... '
Article 21 (1) of Montreal 1999 states that under no circum-
stances can the carrier exclude or limit his liability for a sum not
exceeding 100,000 SDR."9
By introducing a new standard of liability in Article 21(1) of
Montreal 1999, carrier liability above 100,000 SDR where the
carrier fails to prove the absence of negligence on its part or
that the negligence of a third party was the sole cause of the
damage, the drafters correctly removed the Warsaw require-
ment of proof of willful misconduct by the passenger.
III. THE CONCEPT OF A PRE-DISPUTE-SELECTED
FORUM IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
OF PASSENGERS BY AIR
The term "notice" has been used in ways other than that of
Warsaw Article 3(2); for example, in the sphere of choice of law
and forum. 2 " It is not an exaggeration to say that the choice of
law and forum provisions are indispensable parts of most con-
tracts that occur for every day transactions. The concept has a
unique relevance in contracts for the transport of passengers by
117 Id. art. 21 (emphasis added).
"" Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25 (emphasis added).
119 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 21.
121 RESTATFI-ENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF [LAWS § 25 (1971).
2792006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sea or air, domestic or international . 21 This article will analyze
the realm of choice of forum in international transportation by
air based on a United States Supreme Court decision on the
applicability of a choice of forum clause. 122
This article will address two issues: first, how the concept of
choice of forum is related to the discussion presented above on
Article 3(2) of Warsaw; second, and more naturally, why must a
reference be made to a national law to see its applicability on
the international sphere?
On thefirst question. It has been concluded that Montreal 1999
removed one of the Warsaw benefits of delivering a ticket to the
passengers: its use for limiting or excluding liability.123 This
does not, however, mean that there is no use or requirement of
providing a ticket to the passengers. Although the delivery or
non-delivery of a ticket (including the communication of a no-
tice) is no longer grounds for arguing the applicability of the
limitation of liability, the carrier can still insert provisions in the
ticket that ultimately affect the amount of damages a passenger
may recover in cases of negligence.1 24 One way the carrier could
do this is by choosing a local forum that, in its opinion, would
be more convenient for defending the alleged negligence or
that might award a lower amount of damages if the carrier fails
to make a successful Article 21(2) defense. 125
On the second question. For the purposes of this discussion, con-
sideration will be given to the 1991 United States Supreme
Court case that decided whether a choice of forum clause, in-
serted in a non-refundable ticket representing a contract of car-
riage between two United States points, was valid. 126 As will be
121 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
122 Choice of law seems to be a settled concept in international transportation
by air because all the relevant conventions-from Warsaw through to Montreal
1999-grant an exclusive applicability to the conventions for transportation be-
tween the Contracting Parties. See Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 49; Warsaw
Convention, supra note 3, art. 32. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider
whether the carrier and the passenger, in international transportation by air, can
choose a law other than the convention.
123 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
124 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, arts. 47 & 49.
125 Under Article 21(1), a carrier can benefit from choosing a forum which
awards lesser damages within the 100,000 SDR limit. Similarly, under Article
21(2), a carrier can benefit from choosing a forum in which there is less likeli-
hood of finding negligence on its part or a forum which awards lesser damages
within the beyond-100,000 SDR limit.




shown later, Montreal 1999127 deals with the countries that
would be the forums in cases of disputes. The Convention does
not deal with the designation of the particular local forum that
may entertain the disputes arising from the Convention. Thus,
the national laws and rulings of the courts in the country that is
a Montreal forum will continue to determine the court that may
finally decide the international air transportation dispute. In
the realm of the applicable forum, Montreal 1999 accompanies
an international air transportation dispute up to the boundaries
of the forum country. 28 Thereafter, Montreal 1999 seems to
indicate, it is up to the domestic laws and principles of the coun-
try to select the appropriate local forum that entertains the liti-
gation. 129 In this line of analysis, the next logical question is:
what is the validity of a choice of local forum in an international
air transportation dispute? For example, will the choice of a
New York Court as a forum for damages claims, arising from a
United Airlines contract of carriage for a New York-Paris flight,
be valid? 3..
Therefore, regarding the choice of forum, the adequate deliv-
ery of a ticket or other travel documents will continue to be one
of the potential causes of dispute under the new Montreal 1999.
With the above background, a discussion of the Carnival
Cruise"' case and its possible implications on international
transportation by air is needed.
A. THE CARNIVAL CRUISE CASE
The Shutes, a Washington State couple, bought passenger
tickets from Carnival Cruise Lines for a seven day passage on a
ship owned by the petitioner.' 2 Carnival sent the Shutes non-
refundable tickets containing the provisions of the contract of
carriage from its travel agent in Arlington, Washington.'33 In
127 A reference is made to Montreal 1999 because it is the most comprehensive
convention now applicable and because it was built upon the jurisdictional rules
of Warsaw.
12" See Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 33 (designating countries where a case
may be brought, but remaining silent on where within those countries a case may
be brought).
129 See id.
130 The United States, as the domicile of United Airlines, is, according to Arti-
cle 33(1) of Montreal 1999, one of the five fora in cases of damage disputes. The
hypothetical case was developed upon that premise.
131 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
132 Id. at 587.
133 Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the lower left-hand corner of each ticket was a statement that
read, "SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST
PAGES IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CONTRACT ON PAGES
1, 2, 3." '34 Some of the provisions in the twenty-five paragraph
contract read as follows:
Paragraph 3 of the Terms and Conditions of Passage Contract
Ticket stated:
(a) The acceptance of this ticket by the person or persons named
hereon as passengers shall be deemed to be an acceptance and
agreement by each of them of all the terms and conditions of this
Passage Contract Ticket.13
5
Paragraph 8 of the twenty-five paragraph contract read:
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all
disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with
or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a
Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of any other
state or country. "'
Paragraph 16(a) stated, "the Carrier shall not be liable to
make any refund to passengers in respect of ... tickets wholly or
partly.not used by a passenger."137
After receiving the tickets, the Shutes boarded the Tropicale,
Carnival's ship, in Los Angeles. 3 ' In the international waters off
the coast of Mexico, Mrs. Shute slipped on a deck mat and suf-
fered injuries whereof she sued for damages.'39 The Shutes
sued in the District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton, which granted Carnival's summary judgment, upholding
the argument that the contract provided that Florida was the
proper forum and finding that the tickets' delivery in Washing-
ton State was insufficient to create a contact with Washington
State. 140
The Court of Appeals referred to the earlier Supreme Court
case, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 4' where it was held that
"a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power...
134 Id. at 587.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 587-88 (emphasis added).
137 Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 588.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 588.
141 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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should be given effect."' 2 Based on the Bremen statement, the
Court of Appeals stated that the essence of Bremen's pro-forum
selection clause holding was the free negotiation of the parties
involved. 4 ' In the case at hand, however, the contract was a
contract of adhesion, and the respondents did not have the op-
portunity to freely negotiate the forum selection clause.' 4 4 Stat-
ing also that the respondents were physically and financially
unable to pursue the litigation in Florida, the Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court. 4 ' In reversing the Court of Ap-
peals, the Supreme Court distinguished the Carnival Cruise facts
from Bremen. 4"
In Bremen, the parties were the American corporation Zapata
and the German corporation Unterweser, and they had agreed
for the towage of Zapata's oceangoing rig "from Louisiana to a
point in the Adriatic Sea." '147 The parties agreed that any dis-
pute under the contract was to be resolved in the London Court
of Justice.4' A storm in the Gulf of Mexico seriously damaged
the rig and Zapata instructed Unterweser's ship to tow the rig to
the nearest port of refuge, Tampa, Florida.'4 9 Zapata sued Un-
terweser in federal court in Tampa. Unterweser argued that, ac-
cording to the contract, the appropriate court was the London
Court ofJustice. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Zapata. 5' The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded.' 5'
The Supreme Court, in upholding the choice of forum
clause, reasoned that Zapata and Unterweser, being corpora-
tions of different nations involved in a complex and costly trans-
action, were naturally expected to have thoroughly discussed the
choice of forum clause. 152 Reversing the previous trend in
American courts of disfavoring choice of forum clauses, particu-
142 Carnival I, 499 U.S. at 591.
143 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 388 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Carnival Hl].
144 Id.
14- Id. at 389.






52 Id. at 592.
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larly in adhesionary contracts, 5 ' the Supreme Court stated that
"[a] freely negotiated private international agreement, unaf-
fected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power... should be given effect.' 1 54 This is the statement that
the Court of Appeals used in Carnival Cruise to quash the choice
of forum clause. 155
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals in Car-
nival Cruise, cautioned that "[w] e do not adopt the Court of Ap-
peal's determination that a nonnegotiated forum-selection
clause in a form ticket contract is never enforceable simply be-
cause it is not the subject of bargaining."'156 To buttress its find-
ing, the Supreme Court added, first, that a cruise line has the
upper hand in selecting a forum for litigation because it is in-
volved with passengers who come from many different locales.'57
A predetermined forum, therefore, will avoid litigation against a
single cruise line by different passengers in numerous forums in
similar causes of action. 5 1 Second, the Shutes admitted that
they had notice of the forum selection clause, and thus, they
carry the heavy burden introduced in Bremen to prove miscon-
duct or ill intent by the carrier. 59 Third, the Court stated that
the place where the accident occurred was nearer to Florida,
where the petitioner had its principal place of business, than
Washington State. 60
The Court also replied to the Shutes' argument, based on the
Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act of 1936,61 that any
provision contract that purports to lessen, weaken, or avoid the
right of any claimant to a trial by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion is null and void. 162 The Court stated that there was no rea-
son why it should hold that choosing a Florida court in such
circumstances weakened the Shutes' right to claim damages. 16
The Court, referring to the draft documents for the statute,
153 Axel Gehringer, After Carnival Cruise and Sky Reefer: An Analysis of Forum Selec-
tion Clauses in Maritime and Aviation Transactions, 66 J. AiR L. & COM. 633, 646
(2001).
154 Carnival I, 499 U.S. at 591.
155 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 899 F.2d 377, 388 (9th Cir. 1990).
156 Carnival I, 499 U.S. at 593.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 590.
160 Id. at 594.
161 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183 et. seq. (2006).
162 Carnival 1, 499 U.S. at 596.
163 Id.
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mentioned that nothing in the history of the statute indicated
Congress' intent for the statute to apply in circumstances where
the claimants had agreed to litigate their case in a distant
court.' 64
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stressed that the
ticket was a non-refundable Contract of Adhesion. 6 ' Even if the
Shutes had had adequate notice of the forum selection clause,
there was nothing in reality that they could have done to negoti-
ate its terms. The two options they had were to cancel their trip
without a refund or to proceed with their trip, thereby agreeing
to all the terms contained in the ticket. 6 ' He also noted that
only the most meticulous of passengers could read a forum se-
lection clause written in the midst of the twenty-five paragraphs
of fine print on the back of the ticket, especially since there was
nothing the passengers could have done to alter its terms." 7
After Carnival Cruise, American courts have strictly adhered to
the Carnival Cruise ruling and applied it even in situations where
an American bought a ticket in the United States and the se-
lected forum was outside the United States.'""
164 Id.
165 Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
167 Id.
1611 Gehringer, supra note 153, at 651-52.
In Effron v. Sun Line Cruise, Inc., for example, the Court upheld a
forum selection clause in a form passenger contract designating
Athens, Greece as the exclusive forum. The case involved the
purchase of a South American vacation package from Sun Line
Cruises, a New York firm, through a Florida-based travel agent by
Mrs. Effron, a resident of Florida. The transportation of passengers
and baggage was provided solely by Sun Line Greece Special Ship-
ping Co., Inc, a Greek company. The purchased ticket informed
passengers that the carrier with whom they were contracting was
Sun Line Greece, and the company's Greek address and phone
number were listed on the face of the ticket. The ticket contained
a forum selection clause-the existence of which was reasonably
communicated to Mrs. Effron-designating Athens, Greece as the
exclusive forum. During the cruise, Mrs. Effron was injured as a
result of a shipboard fall. She brought suit against Sun Line
Cruises and Sun Line Greece in New York, where she maintained a
second residence and where Sun Line Cruise did business. The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
enforce the forum selection clause holding that Mrs. Effron had
met her burden to show that filing suit in Greece would be a grave
inconvenience. The district court stressed the fact that neither
plaintiff, nor the occurrence sued on, had any connection with
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The Supreme Court, as it did in Carnival Cruise, has also held
that forum selection clauses are valid in the sphere of maritime
law, where they are inserted in bills of lading. 16 9
B. THE SKY REEFER CASE
In one case, the Supreme Court was confronted with the ques-
tion of whether the insertion of a choice of forum clause in bills
of lading allowed the carrier to relieve itself from, or lessen its
liability to, the provisions of § 1303(8) of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act ("COGSA"). 7 °
Section 1303(8) reads:
Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage re-
lieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to
or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault,
or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section,
or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chap-
ter, shall be null and void and of no effect.17'
The Supreme Court, finding in the negative, stated that an
increase in transportation and other costs that the passengers
Greece. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, however, reversed.
The Court of Appeals held that "a forum is not necessarily inconve-
nient because of its distance from pertinent parties or places if it is
readily accessible in a few hours of air travel." Relying on Vimar
Seguros v. Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995), the
court ruled that the costs and difficulties entailed in suing in
Greece, "being but the obvious concomitants of litigation abroad,
do not satisfy The Bremen inconvenience standard." The court sug-
gested that the problem of transporting witnesses to Greece might
be resolved by a commission rogatoire, whereby Greek courts may
request American courts to take testimony. The court's reliance on
Sky Reefer is questionable because Sky Reefer did not involve a
form passenger contract but a form bill of lading. In any event,
Effron v. Sun Line Cruise made clear that Carnival Cruise cannot be
distinguished by arguing that a foreign forum is less convenient
than a forum within the United States. A distinction between for-
eign and domestic fora in determining inconvenience is thus seem-
ingly eliminated. Effron is another example of the recent tendency
among United States courts to enforce all types of forum selection
agreements, no matter where the forum is located, and no matter
whether such an agreement was concluded between sophisticated
businessmen or between sophisticated businessmen and unsophisti-
cated passenger-consumers.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
169 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 541.
170 Id. at 530.
171 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (2006).
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may incur by litigating in the selected forum was not equivalent
to the "relieving from" or "lessening such liability" standard set
in COGSA.' 72 Moreover, the Supreme Court added that the
courts of all the countries which were members to the 1924
Hague Convention were similarly interpreting Article 3(8) of
Hague from which § 1303(8) of COGSA was adopted. 1 73
C. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF MONTREAL 1999 ON THE
CARNIVAL CRUISE-SKY REEFER LINE OF CASES?
We will now move to the impact that Montreal 1999 will have
on the Carnival Cruise-Sky Reefer line of interpretation.
The core question in assessing the impact of the Carnival
Cruise-Sky Reefer cases is whether Montreal 1999 allows parties
the contractual freedom to choose a forum for resolving dis-
putes arising under international transport. In other words, the
question is: would a paragraph like paragraph 8 of the Carnival
Cruise contract of adhesion be valid under Montreal 1999?
Article 33 of Montreal Convention states:
1. An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the State Parties, either before
the court of the domicile of the carrier or of its principal place of
business, or where it has a place of business through which the
contract has been made or before the court at the place of
destination.
2. In respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a
passenger, an action may be brought before one of the courts
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of a
State Party in which at the time of the accident the passenger has
his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from
which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers
by air, either on its own aircraft, or on another carrier's aircraft
pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which that carrier
conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from prem-
ises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier
with which it has a commercial agreement ...
3. Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the
court seised of the case.' 7 4
This is the only article that deals with the forums before which
the disputes of Montreal 1999 must be brought. A literal read-
ing of paragraph 1 of Article 33 would conclude that there are
172 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 534-35.
173 Id. at 536.
17-1 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 33.
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only five places where a case under Montreal 1999 can be
brought, and that selection is left to the option of the
plaintiff.'75
Article 33 raises a number of questions not discussed in this
article. In the sphere of forum non conveniens, courts have held
that the phrase "at the option of the plaintiff' is not as absolute
as it may appear. 1
76
In interpreting the phrase in Article 28(1) of Warsaw, the
predecessor to Article 33 of Montreal 1999, the Fifth Circuit of
the United States held that, in light of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, Article 28 of Warsaw did not give the plaintiff carte
blanche and that if the court chosen by the plaintiff is found to
be inconvenient, the case could be heard at another court.1
77
The court held that Warsaw Article 28(2), which leaves ques-
tions of procedure to the forum, also incorporates the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, long held to be part of the procedural
common law.1 7
8
In 2002, however, Hosaka v. United Airlines,179 which relied on
a previous British case Milor S.R.L. v. British Airways, Plc.,180 held
contrary to the In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana
on July 9, 1982 ("New Orleans") and In re Air Crash off Long Island
New York on July 17, 1996 cases.1 8 1 The Ninth Circuit held that
the wording of Article 28(1) gave the plaintiff an absolute
choice among the forums enumerated therein.1 8 2 It may be
hard, Hosaka being the latest case dealing with the issue of the
absolute right of a plaintiff to choose the forum,1 83 to hold that
the plaintiffs right may be limited contractually.
Although there was a long debate on the issue of forum non
conveniens in the drafting process of Montreal 1999,184 there is
175 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on Jul. 9, 1982, 821 F.2d
1147, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter New Orleans].
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1162; In re Air Crash off Long Island, N.Y., on July 17, 1996, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 207, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Long Island].
178 New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1162; Long Island, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
179 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002).
180 Milor S.R.L. v. British Airways, Plc. [1996] Q.B. 702.
181 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 999.
182 Id. at 1003-04.
183 It remains to be seen what the Supreme Court will decide on this issue
because it denied Hosaka certiorari. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Hosaka, 537 U.S.
1227 (2003) (denying certiorari). For more on Hoska and related forum non con-
veniens issues, see Allan I. Mendelsohn, Recent Developments in the Forum Non Con-
veniens Doctrine, FED. LAw., Feb. 2005.
184 See Convention Minutes, supra note 86, vol. 1 at 104-84.
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no mention of the drafters' discussion on the doctrine of choice
of forum, and the topic was never made a specific part of the
agenda. The possibility of parties selecting a forum was not ad-
dressed in the meetings. Most of the discussions on the issue of
jurisdiction focused on the inclusion of the "fifth" forum pro-
posed by the United States and also found in the presentation
by the International Air Transport Association ("IATA") during
the drafting process of Montreal 1999.185 Thus the question on
the issue of choice of forum remains open under Montreal
1999. A reference to related conventions might give some
insight. 186
Some conventions clearly indicate that the parties can, from a
given pool of forums, choose an applicable forum prior to the
incident. Article 13(1) of the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Carriage of Passenger
Luggage by Sea of May 27th 1967 states that "prior to the occur-
rence of the incident which causes the loss or damage, the par-
ties to the contract of carriage may agree that the claimant shall
have to maintain an action for damages according to his prefer-
ence, only before .... 187
This provision indicates that there is a possibility for the par-
ties to agree on the forum in their contract of carriage, provided
that the forum is one listed in that paragraph. 8 '
Other conventions, on the other hand, indicate that there is
no possibility of selecting a forum and that, in fact, such a clause
is null and void. Articles 17 and 18 of the Athens Convention
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea
of 1974 ("Athens 1974") state:
Art. 17. COMPETENT JURISDICTION 1. An action arising under this
Convention shall, at the option of the claimant, be brought before
one of the courts listed below, provided that the court is located
in a State Party to this Convention: . . . [options similar to those
found in Montreal 1999]
185 ICAO Document, DCW-Min. FCG/3. France and fifty-three African coun-
tries, which had their own articles drafted, opposed the introduction of the fifth
forum.
186 The writer chose to disregard whether the referred conventions came into
effect or not; they are referred to for comparative study purposes only.
117 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
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2. After the occurrence of the incident which has caused the dam-
age, the parties may agree that the claim for damages shall be
submitted to any jurisdiction or to arbitration.
Art. 18. INVALIDITY OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONs Any contractual
provision concluded before the occurrence of the incident which
caused the death of or personal injury to a passenger ... or hav-
ing the effect of restricting the option specified in paragraph 1 of Article
17, shall be null and void .... 189
We can understand from these two conventions that often the
drafters clearly indicate whether they want the parties to have
the right to choose the forum by an agreement concluded
before the incident creating the dispute.
A third group of conventions are unclear on the issue ofjuris-
diction. The International Convention Relating to the Limita-
tions of the Liability of Owners of Sea-going Vessels of October
10, 1957190 and The International Convention of Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims of November 19, 19769' are good
examples.
Montreal 1999 stands between the second and third group of
conventions. Silent on the possibility of choice of forum, Article
33 is drafted similarly to Article 17 of Athens 1974, but excludes
any provision similar to Article 18 of Athens 1974. It is not,
therefore, clear whether Montreal 1999 allows or prohibits the
choice of forum by the parties before an incident occurs. There
are two possible interpretations.
One interpretation is that Hosaka and the literal wording of
Article 33 of Montreal 1999 provide that selection of forum is
subject to no restriction except the choice of the plaintiff. Para-
graph 1 reads, "Action for damages must be brought, at the option
of the plaintiff in the territory of one of the States Parties ....- 9 2 This
indicates that:
1. the choice of the plaintiff cannot be subject to the choice
of forum by Carnival Cruise-type tickets; and
2. even if a choice of forum is somehow accepted, it cannot
be brought to any court but a court "in the territory of one
189 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Lug-
gage by Sea arts. 17-18, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 U.N.T.S. 20 (emphasis added).
190 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of
Owners of Sea-Going Ships, Dec. 21, 1979, 1412 U.N.T.S. 81.
19, Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976,
1456 U.N.T.S. 222.
192 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 33 (emphasis added).
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of the State Parties,""" as indicated in paragraph 1 of Arti-
cle 33.
A second possible interpretation, considering the literal si-
lence of Montreal 1999 on choices of forum, is that there may
be a possibility for choice of forum. Ordinarily, choice of forum
provisions are found in articles that allow room for party auton-
omy and contractual freedom. In Montreal 1999, Article 27, en-
titled Freedom to Contract, states, "Nothing contained in this
Convention shall prevent the carrier from refusing to enter into
any contract of carriage, from waiving any defenses available
under the convention, or from laying down conditions which do not
conflict with the provisions of this Convention.' '
Article 27 is an article that provides a choice to the carrier. It
allows the carrier a choice to refuse to enter into a contract, to
waive defenses, and to lay down conditions not contrary to Mon-
treal 1999. The question, then, is whether inserting a choice of
forum clause in a contract of carriage is contrary to Montreal
1999. On the issue of choice of forum, Montreal 1999 seems to
be literally silent, allowing the implication that providing a
choice of forum would not conflict with Montreal 1999. A possi-
ble limit on the provision of choice of forum would be the intro-
ductory sentence of Article 33 Montreal: "Action for damages
must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one
of the States' Parties.'' 5 Remember also that the phrase "at the
option of the plaintiff' has been interpreted to grant the plain-
tiff an absolute advantage over forum non conveniens defenses. 9 '
If, however, there is a possibility of a choice of forum as dis-
cussed above, the Carnival Cruise holding may be applied in in-
ternational air transport disputes. Carnival Cruise was decided
under United States law.1 97 Thus, the logical question is: would
the United States courts apply the Carnival Cruise interpretation
in a Montreal 1999 case? To return to the example introduced
193 Within the territories of the enumerated countries, however, the parties
would continue to have the freedom of choosing the court to which the case
would be brought, provided that such court does not decline jurisdiction for rea-
sons including absence of subject matterjurisdiction and forum non conveniens.
For example, the choice of forum could state: If a suit is brought in the United
States, it must be brought in the federal district court in the Southern District of
Florida.
94 Montreal 1999, supra note 3, art. 27 (emphasis added).
9 Id. art. 33 (emphasis added).
1 1 See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
197 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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at the beginning of this section, assume United Airlines, in the
tickets delivered to the passengers, indicated that all disputes
against United Airlines covered by Montreal 1999 shall be filed
in a New York District Court. On a particular New York-Paris
flight, an accident injures a British passenger who bought the
ticket from a United Airlines agent in the United Airlines office
in London. The passenger, who presumably had notice of the
forum selection clause, approaches a New York District Court to
decline hearing the case because he wants to file suit in London,
where he bought the ticket. United Airlines argues that the fo-
rum selection clause should be enforced and asks the court to
extend Carnival Cruise to this case. Should, or could, the court
do so?
Forum non conveniens issues set aside, there is a possibility of
extending the Carnival Cruise interpretation to such interna-
tional disputes. It has been indicated earlier that Montreal 1999
does not deal with the particular local court where the case must
be brought. 19 Article 28(1), predecessor to Montreal 1999 Arti-
cle 33, reads, in relevant part:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the high contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination.' 99
In interpreting this text, the Second Circuit stated that the list
of courts indicated in Article 28(1) was meant to identify the
countries where the case must be heard, but the designation of
the particular court was left to the internal laws of the forum
country.200 Therefore, Carnival Cruise, which governs designa-
198 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
- Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 28.
20o Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir. 1965). In
Mertens, an airplane accident occurred in Japan and the plaintiffs brought a suit
in New York, where the office of the Delaware Corporation, Flying Tiger Line,
was located. Id. at 853. The defendant argued that Article 28(1) established four
"places" within the territory of a High Contracting Party and that a court located
in another place in that High Contracting Party cannot assume jurisdiction-
thus the New York Court [the Southern District of New York] was not a proper
forum. Id. at 854. The United States Court of Appeals, in rejecting the defen-
dant's argument, stated:
However, we read Article 28(1) quite differently. The "places"
specified refer to the High Contracting Parties, not to areas within
a particular High Contracting Party. An action may be brought, at
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tion of the local court within which the case must be heard,
would confirm the New York District Court as the court in which
this fictitious case would be heard.
The possibility of a choice of forum under Montreal 1999 will
be one of the questions that would need a uniform answer from
the new international air transportation law.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
" Since the inception of Warsaw 1929, interested parties have
attempted to strike a balance between the low amount of
recoverable damages and the possibility for the passengers
to break the limit. As the damage cap was raised with every
Warsaw amendment, the difficulty for the passengers to
break the limit also rose.
* In the second half of the twentieth century, as carriers be-
came more efficient and financially stronger, the orienta-
tion of Warsaw became sympathetic to the passengers.2 1 In
the 1996 IATA Inter-carrier Agreement, for example, the
carriers agreed to abandon invoking the Warsaw provisions
that would limit their liability.
" Montreal 1999 raised the amount of recoverable damage,
developed a two-tier liability statute, and dropped the two
Warsaw grounds for breaking the damage cap (non-delivery
of a travel document and willful misconduct).
" The effect, under Montreal 1999, of non-compliance with
the mandatory requirement of giving a travel document
and notice to the passengers (Article 3(1)-(4)) remains to
be seen. This is because historically these two requirements
were linked with depriving the carrier of the benefits of lim-
itation and exclusion of liability, and such deprivation has
the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of a High Contracting
Party, if the domicile of the carrier, the place of business at which
the contract was made, or the place of destination is within that
country. Plaintiff's choice of forum within that country is governed
by the internal law, with all its intricacies and complexities, not by
the Warsaw Convention.
Id. at 855. Note that the phrase "at the option of the plaintiff' was used in an-
other sense in this case, not in response to the possibility of choice of forum by
an agreement.
201 See Vijay Poonoosamy, Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consol-
idation of the Warsaw System, at Al-A2, ICAO Doc. C-WP/10576 (1997) (recounting
the increases in air carrier liability limits).
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been eliminated by Montreal 1999. Nevertheless, we will
continue to have a notice that is similar to the Warsaw
notice.
" The proper delivery of a travel document will continue to
be important in another sphere of dispute: choice of
forum.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
* The phrase "including those relating to limitation of liabil-
ity" should be interpreted to include the exclusion provi-
sions so that it is in line with the underlying Montreal 1999
principle that the carrier should be liable without limitation
for injury caused by negligence.
" The possibility of a choice of forum clause should be read
into Montreal 1999; however, to be in line with Article 33
(giving the passenger the right to choose the forum) the
carrier must bear the burden of proving that the passenger
had notice of the choice of forum clause.
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